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Abstract
The present work outlines a logical and philosophical conception of propositions in
relation to a group of puzzles that arise by quantifying over them: the Russell-Myhill
paradox, the Prior-Kaplan paradox, and Prior’s Theorem. First, I motivate an inter-
pretation of the Russell-Myhill paradox as depending on aboutness. Aboutness informs
the notion of propositional identity, of which I will offer two formalizations, depending
on choices that have to be made about the syntax of propositional variables. I then
extend to propositions a predicative response to the paradoxes presented in Linnebo
(2013). On this approach, modal operators are used to uncover the implicit relation
of dependence that characterizes propositions that are about propositions, and which
Russell-Myhill shows to be of logical significance. Thus, the justification for predica-
tivity is found in two ideas: (i) propositions are, in some sense, language-dependent
entities; (ii) there is a distinction between what a sentence says (its semantic value)
and what it expresses (a proposition). The propositions that can be expressed out-
strip those that are, so to speak, “available” for reference and quantification. A modal
abstraction principle for propositions formalizes this conception, and its benefits are
shown by application to other intensional puzzles. The resulting view is an alternative
to the plenitudinous metaphysics of unconstrained comprehension principles defended
by Bacon et al. (2016), among others.
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The notion of aboutness has been around for some time, and has recently received some
attention in relation to the logic of hyperintensionality.1 Intuitively, sentence (1) is about
Sal.
1. Sal is running.
Let us stipulate that the proposition expressed by a sentence is about whatever the
sentence is about.
Perhaps we can agree on a couple of intuitively plausible principles. For example, for
any object n, there is a proposition about n. This is plausible because it does not seem
too hard to form a thought about a given object. For example, for any n, there is the
proposition that n is running, or the proposition that n is a number. Another principle
that seems plausible is that propositions about distinct objects are distinct. Since 2 6= 3,
the proposition that 2 > 0 is distinct from the proposition that 3 > 0, even though these
are both necessarily true propositions.
We could thus agree with the following Existence and Identity claims, relating the
notion of aboutness, a domain of objects, and propositions about its members:2
(E) For every m, there is a proposition about m;
(I) For every m and n, every proposition about m is about n, and conversely, only if
m = n.
There seems to be no reason why versions of E and I should not hold in the higher-order
domain, where m and n are variables over sets. Indeed, it is natural to think that the
proposition expressed by (2) is about (the set of) sailors.
2. Some sailors are running.
1Among others, see Gilbert Ryle, “About,” Analysis, i, 1 (1933): 10–12; David Lewis, “Statements
Partly About Observation,” Philosophical Papers, xvii, 1 (1988): 1–31; John Perry, “Possible Worlds and
Subject Matter,” in J. Perry, ed., The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays (Palo Alto,
CA: CSLI Publications, 1989): pp. 145–60. On hyperintensionality, see Daniel Nolan, “Hyperintensional
Metaphysics,” Philosophical Studies, clxxi, 1 (2014): 149–60; Stephen Yablo, Aboutness (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2014); Kit Fine, “Angellic Content,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, xlv, 2
(2016): 199–226; for an overview, see Peter Hawke, “Theories of Aboutness,” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, xcvi, 4 (2018): 697–723.
2The relevant relation is that of a proposition being entirely about something (including, say, propositions
entirely about pluralities).
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for (2) says of (the set of) sailors that some (of its members) are running. If propositions
can be about sets, some propositions belong to the set they are about. For example,
a proposition about the set of abstract objects belongs to the set it is about, assuming
that propositions are abstract objects. And so E and I set up an injection into the set of
propositions of the set of all sets of propositions. A familiar diagonal argument brings up
the inconsistency with Cantor’s theorem, as Russell explains (using ‘class’ instead of ‘set’):
If m be a class of propositions, the proposition ‘every m is true’ may or may
not be itself an m. But there is a one-one relation of this proposition to m: if
n be different from m, ‘every n is true’ is not the same proposition as ‘every
m is true.’ Consider now the whole class of propositions of the form ‘every m
is true,’ and having the property of not being members of their respective m’s.
Let this class be w, and let p be the proposition ‘every w is true.’ If p is a w,
it must possess the defining property of w; but this property demands that p
should not be a w. On the other hand, if p be not a w, then p does possess the
defining property of w, and therefore is a w. Thus the contradiction appears
unavoidable.3
This is the Russell-Myhill paradox (henceforth, RM; also known as Russell propositional
paradox, or Appendix B paradox).4 Russell considers propositions of the form ‘every
m is true,’ which he calls logical products. As noted by Harold Hodes, this syntax is
unnecessary.5 The argument is unaffected by considering propositions of the form ‘some
m is true,’ ‘m is greater than 0,’ or whatever. If (2) is about the set of sailors, so ‘every
m is true’ is about the set of ms. The important thing about logical products is that they
are propositions about sets, for then the motivation for asserting the premises becomes
compelling. The premises are:
(E) the existence claim implicit in the use of the definite article: for every m, Russell
considers ‘the proposition “every m is true”’;
(I) the identity claim stated contrapositively: ‘if n be different from m, “every n is true”
is not the same proposition as “every m is true”.’
3Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), at
Appendix B, Section 500.
4For an accessible introduction to the Russell-Myhill paradox and some helpful background, see
Kevin Klement, “Russell-Myhill Paradox,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/
par-rusm/.
5Harold Hodes, “Why Ramify?,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, lvi, 2 (2015): 379–415.
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The rest of RM is logic and set theory. It can be understood as a paradox of aboutness.6
This is not, and not intended to be, a reconstruction of Russell’s thought. Part of
my goal in this paper is to place RM within larger contemporary debates on propositions,
the logic of attitudes, and hyperintensionality. By reconstructing RM as a paradox of
aboutness, we uncover an argumentative structure that is closely related to that of Russell’s
more famous set-theoretic paradox. This will help to appreciate what sort of formal theories
RM shows to be inconsistent. In the second part of the paper, I will present a modal account
of RM inspired by analogous accounts of the set-theoretic paradoxes.7 The resulting view
is articulated by an abstraction principle for propositions, in which, in order to restore
consistency, we use modal operators to capture the logic of the dependence relation implicit
in the claim that some propositions are about propositions. In the final section, some
benefits of the modal abstractionist conception of semantic objects developed in the paper
are found in the treatment of other intensional puzzles: the Prior-Kaplan paradox and
Prior’s Theorem.8 The resulting universe of propositions is not as rich as impredicative
quantification would sanction, but allows for hyperintensional distinctions, and for a unified
pattern of response to the intensional puzzles.
1 Possible solutions
Frege dismissed RM, alleging that Russell blurred the distinction between sense and refer-
ence.9 On point of fact, Frege was right, as Russell’s reasoning cannot be reproduced as
6According to Tucker and Thomason (2011), RM is neither truth-theoretic (like the Liar), nor set-
theoretic (like Burali-Forti), and it falsifies Ramsey’s famous classification of the antinomies in two classes.
See Dustin Tucker and Richmond Thomason, “Paradoxes of Intensionality,” The Review of Symbolic Logic,
iv, 3 (2011): 394–411; and Frank P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925). I would suggest that RM is an aboutness-theoretic paradox,
hence still semantic, though not truth-theoretic. RM falsifies Ramsey’s distinction to the extent that all
semantic paradoxes are expected to be taken care of by revising the logic of truth. RM is hardly set-
theoretic, as the claim that a set is “about” its members is no part of our conception of set. But it’s hardly
truth-theoretic, because disquotation principles play no apparent role in the reasoning.
7Among others, see Øystein Linnebo, “The Potential Hierarchy of Sets,” The Review of Symbolic Logic,
vi, 2 (2013): 205–28; and Geoffrey Hellman, Mathematics Without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural
Interpretation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989). For a similar approach to the intensional
paradoxes, see Andy Yu, “A Modal Account of Propositions,” Dialectica, lxxi, 4 (2017): 463–88.
8Arthur Prior, Objects of Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); David Kaplan, “A Problem in
Possible World Semantics,” in D. Raffman, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, N. Asher, eds., Modality, Morality, and
Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): pp.
41–52.
9Gottlob Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, in G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambar-
tel, C. Thiel, A. Veraart, B. McGuinness, H. Kaal, eds., (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), at pp. 149ff.
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it stands in a framework that reinforces the distinction. He was also correct, I think, on a
more general level: the semantic value of a sentence (its referent, in Fregean terminology)
shouldn’t be confused with what the sentence expresses (its sense, or thought). However,
it is well known that if one formalizes Frege’s implicit commitments to a hierarchy of
senses, one is able to formulate a version of RM. So it seems that Frege’s project, broadly
understood, that is, so as to include his semantic theory, is vulnerable to RM.10
Harold Hodes expresses some misgivings concerning Russell’s use of bound variables in
sentence position – a topic reminiscent of Frege’s worries.11 The legitimacy of such binding,
however, is orthogonal to the possibility of formulating Russell’s reasoning in a rigorous
way. To illustrate this point, I will present two derivations below: a “Fregean” one in which
propositional variables only occur in name position, and another, more “Russellian,” which
allows variable binding in sentence position. There is a conceptual issue at the bottom of
RM that is not to be eliminated by a sanitized syntax.
I shall focus on two possible proposals about the significance of RM. (The set of solutions
suggested in the literature, or merely conceivable, is much broader.) These two options
amount to rejecting E, or rejecting I. The latter option consists in curtailing how much
hyperintensionality one can consistently have. Russell assumes that propositions about
distinct sets are distinct. I said that a more general commitment is intuitively plausible:
propositions about distinct objects are distinct. However, according to some authors RM
shows that, as one might say, there are more distinctions in Heaven and Earth than are
conceivable in thought.12 More precisely, propositions about different objects could be
identical. According to some of these authors, the loss of hyperintensionality might be
compensated by unrestricted generality.
Rejection of E is (one way of implementing) a predicative restriction on the comprehen-
sion principle governing which sets of propositions there are. There is good philosophical
motivation for this proposal, coming from the idea that not all expressible propositions
can always be referred to, or quantified over. Intuitively, reference to and quantification
over propositions that are about a set depends on the prior availability of the members
10John Myhill, “Problems arising in the Formalization of Intensional Logic,” Logique et Analyse, i, 1
(1958): 78–83; for an overview, see Kevin Klement, Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference (New York
NY: Routledge, 2002).
11Hodes, “Why Ramify?,” op. cit.
12Among others, see Gabriel Uzquiano, “A Neglected Resolution of Russell’s Paradox of Propositions,”
The Review of Symbolic Logic, viii, 2 (2015): 328–44; Cian Dorr, “To Be F Is To Be G,” Philosophical
Perspectives, xxx, 1 (2016): 39–134; Jeremy Goodman, “Reality is Not Structured,” Analysis, lxxvii, 1
(2017): 43–53.
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of that set. This is because reference and quantification allow us to express further and
further thoughts, making more propositions available. In this respect, a version of pred-
icativism finds a natural application in the present setting, and supports a conception of
the metaphysics of propositions justified by these intuitive remarks. Similar remarks on
the stability of reference can be found in recent work by Sean Walsh, and perhaps in the
noble origins of predicativism in mathematics: the work of Poincaré, Russell, and Weyl.13
2 Synonymy
In the passage quoted above, Russell appeals without definition to the notion of a proposi-
tion being “the same” as another. This notion is central to principle I, and to the idea that
propositions about distinct sets are distinct. I proceed to a precise definition, building on
the work of Alonzo Church, who formalized the notion of propositional identity implicit in
Principia Mathematica.14
Quine once said that propositions are ‘shadows of sentences.’15 He meant that propo-
sitions should be dismissed from serious ontology. On the other hand, it is intriguing to
think that the cardinal numbers are ‘shadows’ of equinumerosity relations among concepts,
though this is no reason to deny that there are numbers. Crispin Wright says:
pure abstract objects [...] are no more than shadows cast by the syntax of our
discourse.16
With apologies to Quine, I take the direction not of nominalism but of a thin ontology.
13Sean Walsh, “Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church’s Intensional Logic,” Journal of
Philosophical Logic, xlv, 3 (2015): 277–326. In several respects, the present approach is similar to the latter.
A macroscopic difference is that Walsh works within the Logic of Sense and Denotation (Alonzo Church,
“A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation,” in P. Hellen, H. Kallen, S. Langer, eds., Structure,
Method, and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer (New York, NY: Liberal Arts Press, 1951),
pp. 3–24). A detailed comparison between various types of predicative systems is left for another occasion.
Further work on the Russell-Myhill, which I do not discuss here for reasons of space, includes most notably
the work of C. Anthony Anderson. See C. Anthony Anderson, “Some New Axioms for the Logic of Sense
and Denotation: Alternative (0),” Noûs, xiv, 2 (1980): 217–34; and C. Anthony Anderson, “Semantical
Antinomies in the Logic of Sense and Denotation,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, xxviii, 1 (1987):
99–114.
14See Alonzo Church, “Russellian Simple Type Theory,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, xlvii (1973): 21–33; Alonzo Church, “Comparison of Russell’s Resolution of the
Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, xli, 4 (1976): 747–60; and Alonzo
Church, “Russell’s Theory of Identity of Propositions,” Philosophia Naturalis, xxi, 2/4 (1984): 513–22.
15Willard V. O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), at p. 10.
16Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), at p. 181.
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Propositions are given to us, in some sense, by the sentences that express them, as numbers
are (perhaps) given by equinumerosity relations.
Propositional identity, on this proposal, is defined by synonymy, understood as an
equivalence relation on sentences. Formally, we expect propositional identity to suffice for
substitutional reasoning, that is reasoning by Leibniz’s Law:
∀x∀y(x = y → ∀F (Fx→ Fy)) LL:
Fortunately, we won’t need a full list of properties of the relation synonymy, for it turns out
that the assumptions needed for the paradox are very modest. So, even if a full analysis
of the concept of synonymy is perhaps beyond our grasp, we can say enough for assessing
RM.
It is convenient to work in the following types:
1. e is a type;
2. for 0 ≤ i ≤ j, if νi, ..., νj are types, (νi, ..., νj) is a type;
and nothing else is a type. We call e the type of individuals. Note that by setting 0 = i = j,
the second clause gives a type (), which we may regard as the type of propositions. A type
(νi, ..., νj), with 0 < i ≤ j, is the type of functions from objects of type νi, ..., νj , to an
object of type (). So, for example, (e) is the type of functions from one individual to a
proposition, such as the function expressed by ‘is greater than 0.’ Syntactically, I assume
we have variables for objects of any type, using a special syntax for propositional variables.
1. individual variables x, y, ... of type e;
2. predicate variables X,Y, ... of type (νi, ..., νj) for 0 < i ≤ j;
3. propositional variables p, q, ... of type ().
There are two ways to understand propositional variables. They might be a special case
of second-order variables for predicates of zero arguments.17 Alternatively, they might be
first-order variables ranging over the special sort of propositions. In this case,
∃pψ
17Prior, “Objects of Thought,” op. cit. See also Timothy Williamson, “Everything,” Philosophical
Perspectives, xvii, 1 (2003): 415–65.
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is just an abbreviation of
∃x(Px ∧ ψ)
where P is the predicate ‘is a proposition.’ The latter option seems to be often implicit in
current work in metaphysics.18 The two options correlate with different attitudes toward
the possibility of variable binding in sentence position, which is a source of philosophical
controversy.19 In order not to compromise any issues, I shall discuss both options. For
present purposes, it turns out that the choice is really stylistic, since paradoxical reasoning
may be reproduced either way.
I assume the familiar syntax of second-order logic. This includes a comprehension
axiom which, intuitively, converts a predicate of propositions or individuals into an object
in the range of the second-order quantifiers. Note that this allows to generalize only over
a relatively small part of the full type-theoretic universe. This is not an ideological choice,
but one whose purpose is to keep the discussion focused: only relatively modest resources
are needed for RM.
∃X∀xg∀ph(X〈xg, ph〉 ↔ ψ〈xg, ph〉) Comprehension:
where xg, ph are sequences of g, h-many variables of type e and (), respectively. As usual,
X does not occur in ψ.
I take identity to be an undefined primitive in type e: a reflexive relation for which LL
holds. The notion of identity in higher types is defined. In type (νi, ..., νj), for 0 < i ≤ j,
it is defined extensionally.
∀X∀X ′(∀xg∀pk(X〈xg, ph〉 ↔ X ′〈xg, ph〉)↔ X = X ′) Extensionality:
Strictly speaking, we should use a different symbol for identity here, but conventions are
sufficiently well-established, and context will disambiguate. An indiscernibility principle
analogous to LL for predicate variables can be established by induction in the metatheory.
Identity in type () is also defined, albeit by a different principle. Extensionality is vac-
uous since propositions have no arguments. Conceptually, propositions are not extensional
objects, whose identity conditions are defined by their members. Instead, as I said, proposi-
18Among others, see Jeffrey King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks, New Thinking About Propositions
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
19Nicholas K. Jones, “Propositions and Cognitive Relations,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
cxix, 2 (2019): 157–78.
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tional identity relies on synonymy: an informal and notoriously slippery notion. Following
Church, I introduce a symbol for hyperintensional equivalence, to express synonymy in the
object language.20 This is the first of two notational innovations I shall add to ordinary
second-order logic, in order to formalize RM.
A formula ‘ψ ⇔ ϕ’ says that ψ is hyperintensionally equivalent to ϕ, or, roughly, that
the sentences ψ and ϕ are synonymous. These glosses convey what is meant, I believe, at
least as a first pass, although they wrongly suggest some kind of semantic ascent. This
is not a reason for concern: it is just as convenient to express what ‘a = b’ means by
saying that a and b are co-referential – even though there is nothing metalinguistic about
identity. Similarly, hyperintensional equivalence is not metalinguistic: it has the syntax of
an ordinary connective. Moreover, I assume that it has at least the following properties:
Reflexivity: ψ ⇔ ψ
Symmetry: ψ ⇔ ϕ→ ϕ⇔ ψ
Transitivity: (ψ ⇔ ϕ ∧ ϕ⇔ φ)→ ψ ⇔ φ
Hyp1: ∀x∀y(ψx⇔ ψy → x = y)
Hyp2: ∀X∀Y (ψX ⇔ ψY → X = Y )
Reflexivity, Symmetry, and Transitivity, ensure that hyperintensional equivalence is
indeed an equivalence. The last two conditions ensure that synonymy is a genuinely hy-
perintensional notion. Let a, b be metavariables for variables of extensional types (that is,
individual or predicate variables, provided a and b are of the same type). Then we can
state Hyp1 and Hyp2 as a single formula:
∀a∀b(ψa⇔ ψb→ a = b) Hyp:
Hyp is plausible, at least insofar as one finds principle I plausible. A sentence obtained
by predicating ψ of a is intuitively about a, as (1) and (2) suggest.21 If so, then Hyp
20See in particular Church, “Russell’s Theory of Identity of Propositions,” op. cit. There is more than
one notion of propositional identity in Church’s work. The notion of ‘strict equivalence’ is an amendment
of the earlier notion of ‘intensional’ or ‘synonymous isomorphism,’ and the logical core of Alternative (0):
the one among Church’s proposals that underlies the metaphysics of Neo-Russellian propositions. The
notion of hyperintensional equivalence is modeled on strict equivalence, although I depart from Church at
various junctures. See also Alonzo Church, “Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief,” Philosophical
Studies, v, 5 (1954): 65–73; and Alonzo Church, “Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense
and Denotation (Part II),” Noûs, viii, 2 (1974): 135–56.
21So much is explicitly assumed by John Perry, in his discussion of aboutness. See Perry, “Possible Worlds
and Subject Matter,” op. cit. Depending on further details, ψa may also be about whatever ψ is about,
but with such details we need not be concerned.
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asserts (the contrapositive of the claim) that sentences about distinct things are not syn-
onymous. Hyperintensional equivalence thus incorporates the fine degree of distinctions
among thoughts that is motivated by aboutness considerations.
Further assumptions about synonymy would be desirable to regiment the behaviour of
this relation. For example, Church comments that ‘if sentences differ only by alphabetic
change of bound variables, the corresponding propositions are the same,’ which seems
plausible.22 Still more axioms could be added for a full logic of synonymy. However, the
resources required by RM are quite weak, and indeed are limited to Reflexivity and Hyp –
more precisely, Hyp2. Since the goal here is not to work out the logic of synonymy, I shall
not officially assume anything beyond Hyp, and the axioms for equivalence.
The second and final notational innovation I will introduce is a term-forming operator
[·], which, syntactically, takes a well-formed formula and yields a singular term. Intuitively,
‘[ψ]’ is a singular term denoting the proposition expressed by ψ. In English, this operator
roughly corresponds to the expression ‘that,’ or ‘the proposition that,’ which converts a
sentence ‘grass is green’ into the proposition-denoting expression ‘the proposition that grass
is green.’
I can now define propositional identity in terms of synonymy. This can be a definition
by abstraction, adopting for present purposes the sophisticated formal and philosophical
technology developed in the debate over Neo-Fregean philosophy of arithmetic. Abstraction
is a well-investigated way to supply a thin ontology by means of definitions of identity. We
can use it to explore the idea that propositions are ‘shadows of sentences.’23
The general form of a definition by abstraction is that of a definition of a class of
objects designated by the singular terms on the left-hand side of Abstraction, by taking
equivalence classes of objects quantified over on the right-hand side.
§α = §β ↔ α ∼ β Abstraction:
It is a matter of controversy whether such definitions are acceptable, especially from a
Fregean perspective.24 If they are, perhaps on more general grounds, they might be suitable
22Church, “Russell’s Theory of Identity of Propositions,” op. cit., at p. 516.
23On Neo-Fregeanism, see Crispin Wright, Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen: Ab-
erdeen University Press, 1983); Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, The Reason’s Proper Study (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 2001). On definition of identity by abstraction, see Agust́ın Rayo, The Construction of Logical
Space (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Øystein Linnebo, Thin Objects: An Abstrac-
tionist Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
24Frege notoriously considered and rejected a proposal to define numbers by abstraction in his Die
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for present purposes. We can then try defining propositional identity as follows:
[ψ] = [ϕ]↔ ψ ⇔ ϕ PropAbst:
This is a schematic principle of the form of Abstraction. Each of its instances asserts that
the proposition expressed by ‘ψ’ is identical to the proposition expressed by ‘ϕ’ just in case
ψ and ϕ are synonymous. As I remarked with regards to Extensionality, it is not a given
that the symbol ‘=’ can occur in PropAbst. The principle, however, is adequate at least
in the following sense: if p and q are the propositions expressed by ψ and ϕ respectively,
then ψ and ϕ are synonymous only if q and p have the same properties.
∀p∀q(p = [ψ] ∧ q = [ϕ]→ (ψ ⇔ ϕ→ ∀F (Fp→ Fq)))
That is, synonymy is a congruence over propositions (this can be shown in the metatheory).
Similarly, LL states that identity of individuals is a congruence over individuals.
3 Two versions of Russell-Myhill
The semantics of [·] varies depending on whether propositional variables are sentential or
nominal. Let us begin by assuming that propositions are special-sorted first-order objects.
If so, the operator [·] picks an object of type (), that is, a proposition, given the semantic
value of a sentence. In order to reconstruct RM, it is not necessary to be specific about
the semantic values of sentences. It is possible, for example, to take sentences to designate
truth-values, which might as well be two special individuals of type e, namely 0 and 1. In
this case, the operator [·] maps truth-values to propositions. It is also possible to enrich the
background type theory, and take the semantic values of sentences to be sets of possible
Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl (Breslau:
W. Koebner, 1884), translated by J. L. Austin as The Foundations of Arithmetic: a logico-mathematical
enquiry into the Concept of Number (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). Frege’s misgivings are related to the
infamous ‘Caesar Problem.’ Besides controversy on what the problem is, there is controversy on which
strategies are available in the Neo-Fregan program for avoiding it. For an introduction to this vast literature,
see Hale and Wright, “The Reason’s Proper Study,” op. cit., Richard Kimberly Heck, “The Julius Caesar
Objection,” in R. K. Heck, ed., Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 273–308; Peter Sullivan and Michael Potter, “Hale on Caesar,”
Philosophia Mathematica, v, 2 (1997): 135–52; Fraser MacBride, “Speaking with Shadows: A Study of
Neo-Logicism,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, liv, 1 (2003): 103–63; Fraser MacBride,
“The Julius Caesar Objection: More Problematic Than Ever,” in F. MacBride, ed., Identity and Modality
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 174–202.
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worlds. Then the operator [·] maps sets of worlds to propositions. In all this, propositions
are the senses of sentences, and need not be identified with the (extensional or intensional)
semantic values of sentences. We thus draw a distinction between what a sentence says (its
semantic value), and what a sentence expresses (a proposition).
Initially, I shall assume that we can infer ∃xFx from a statement of the form Ft. Since
the only singular terms we need to worry about are those designating propositions, this
assumption may be captured by the following claim.
F [ψ]→ ∃pFp/[ψ] Existence1:
Note that a singular term [ψ] is replaced by a bound propositional variable, which is
consequently in name position.
Under these assumptions, the core observation to be drawn from RM is this:
Theorem. PropAbst, Hyp, Comprehension, and Existence1 are jointly incon-
sistent in second-order logic with propositional variables, understood as special
sorted first-order variables.
The derivation proceeds as follows. Consider the open formula ∃X(p = [fX]∧¬Xp). This
is satisfied by a proposition p just in case there is a set X such that p is the proposition
that X is f but p is not itself an X. Here f can be anything of the right type: Russell used
‘every ... is true.’ By Comprehension, there exists a set R such that ∀p(Rp ↔ ∃X(p =
[fX] ∧ ¬Xp)). Consider now the proposition expressed by ‘fR,’ which is designated by
‘[fR].’ By contraposing Existence1, R[fR] ↔ ∃X([fR] = [fX] ∧ ¬X[fR]). Suppose
R[fR] for reductio. Then ∃X([fR] = [fX] ∧ ¬X[fR]). So there is some H such that
[fR] = [fH] ∧ ¬H[fR]. By the first conjunct and PropAbst left-to-right, fR ⇔ fH. By
Hyp, R = H. By Extensionality, ∀p(Rp ↔ Hp). By Existence1, R[fR] ↔ H[fR]. Since
¬H[fR], we contradict the reductio hypothesis and conclude ¬R[fR]. By the reflexivity
of identity, [fR] = [fR] ∧ ¬R[fR],25 and so ∃X([fR] = [fX] ∧ ¬X[fR]). Thus, R[fR].
Contradiction.
This derivation assumes, besides PropAbst, Hyp, Comprehension, and Existence1, the
Reflexivity of synonymy and Extensionality for sets. These last two principles are hardly
controversial. The argument assumes, however, that propositions are special first-order
objects – and this might be suspicious. To avoid such assumption, we can allow for variable
25The reflexivity of identity among proposition-designating singular terms follows from PropAbst right-
to-left and Reflexivity of hyperintensional synonymy.
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binding in sentence position and interpret such variables as second order. We should then
make some changes. First, we reformulate Existence1:
ψ(ϕ)→ ∃pψp/ϕ Existence2:
In Existence2, the bound propositional variable replaces a sentence, which is a syntactic
constituent of the complex sentence in the antecedent. Secondly, predicates of propositions
are systematically converted into prenectives, if they have a nominal argument, or else
connectives.26 That is, we reformulate an expression R[fR] as RfR, with fR a sentential
constituent of the latter. Finally, the sentential argument of the operator [·] can now be
bound by a propositional quantifier. The simplest way to understand this is, semantically,
to take [·] to be redundant. Syntactically, however, it does the same job as above: it converts
a sentence into a singular term for the proposition it expresses. This allows for singular
terms designating propositions to occur besides the identity relation (which presumably
takes nominal arguments).27 With these changes, we can show that:
Theorem. Hyp, Comprehension, and Existence2 are jointly inconsistent in
second-order logic with propositional variables, understood as second-order vari-
ables in sentence position.
The derivation is similar. By Comprehension, but choosing a different comprehension
formula, there exists a set R such that ∀p(Rp ↔ ∃X(p ⇔ fX ∧ ¬Xp)). By Existence2,
RfR ↔ ∃X(fR ⇔ fX ∧ ¬XfR). Suppose RfR for reductio. Then ∃X(fR ⇔ fX ∧
¬XfR). So there is some H such that (fR ⇔ fH) ∧ ¬HfR. By the first conjunct and
Hyp, R = H. By Extensionality, ∀p(Rp ↔ Hp). Hence RfR ↔ HfR. Since ¬HfR,
we contradict the reductio hypothesis and conclude ¬RfR. By Reflexivity of synonymy,
(fR⇔ fR) ∧ ¬RfR, and so ∃X((fR⇔ fX) ∧ ¬XfR). Thus, RfR. Contradiction.
Both derivations have their merits, setting aside what one thinks of propositional vari-
ables. The second derivation is more faithful to Russell’s reasoning in Principles of Math-
ematics. The first is helpful in order to understand what kind of paradox RM is: it can
be seen as a paradox of abstraction, much like Russell’s more famous paradox from Basic
26See Prior, “Objects of Thought,” op. cit. and Robert Trueman, “The Prenective View of Propositional
Content,” Synthese, cxcv, 4 (2018): 1799–825.
27 Further degrees of freedom are possible. Church, “Russell’s Theory of Identity of Propositions,” op.
cit., who in turn follows Alfred N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1927), allows for the identity predicate to take propositional variables as
arguments. This way, hyperintensional equivalence collapses on identity among variables.
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Law V. This observation might help us articulating a response, insofar as we have a view
about what could be wrong with Basic Law V.28
As for Russell’s set-theoretic paradox, it is not mandatory to state the abstraction prin-
ciple as a premise in order to show the inconsistency: there, it suffices to consider the set
purportedly designated by the term ‘{x | x 6∈ x},’ and to assume that sets are extensional.
Likewise, PropAbst need not be stated as a premise, so long as one assumes that ‘[fR]’
designates a proposition, and that hyperintensionally equivalent propositions are identical.
The second derivation brings out that what’s really inconsistent with Cantor’s theorem is
Hyp (in fact, Hyp2): Hyp establishes an injection of the set of sets of propositions into
the set of propositions.29 Each set of propositions X is correlated to a proposition [fX].
Moreover, for two distinct sets of propositions, X 6= Y , Hyp entails that ¬(ψX ⇔ ψY ),
hence by PropAbst [ψX] 6= [ψY ]. Thus different sets of propositions are correlated to dis-
tinct propositions. But by Cantor’s theorem there can be no relation between propositions
and their sets that is both functional and onto.
4 Too much hype?
According to Jeremy Goodman, rejection of Hyp ‘implies that reality is not structured in
the manner of the sentence we use to talk about it.’ Gabriel Uzquiano agrees that RM ‘is
best viewed as a constraint on propositional granularity’ that ‘appears to put pressure on
the Russellian conception of propositions.’ This lesson is also endorsed by Cian Dorr, in an
argument against the thesis that propositions are individuated as finely as the sentences
that express them. According to these authors, RM is a reductio of Hyp. This diagnosis
allows us to retain classicality and impredicativity.30 There are two points to make.
First, the paradox does disappear if one thinks of propositions as coarse-grained, not
just technically but conceptually. If propositions are sets of possible worlds, for example,
28Russell did not regard abstraction principles as legitimate at the time he wrote the The Principles of
Mathematics. There he says: ‘of the three kinds of definition admitted by Peano – the nominal definition,
the definition by postulates, and the definition by abstraction ... I recognize only the nominal’ (ibid., p.
112). Perhaps this explains, in part, why he did not present RM as a paradox of abstraction.
29This observation is clearly stated by Goodman, “Reality is Not Structured,” op. cit., in whose paper
Hyp is called Structure.
30Goodman, “Reality is Not Structured,” op. cit., at p. 46; Uzquiano, “A Neglected Resolution of
Russell’s Paradox of Propositions,” op. cit., at p. 343; Dorr, “To Be F Is To Be G,” op. cit., at pp. 63–64.
Some possible strategies for rescuing the theory of structured propositions from this analysis are discussed
by Peter Fritz, Harvey Lederman, and Gabriel Uzquiano, “Closed Structure,” Journal of Philosophical
Logic, forthcoming.
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there is no good reason why Hyp should be true. After all, sentences that are about
distinct things need not express distinct sets of possible worlds. The proposition that
2 > 0 is identical to the proposition that 3 > 0, both being necessarily true propositions,
even though 2 6= 3. However, nobody thinks that this is a good feature of possible world
theories of propositions. Even more puzzling is to say that this bad consequence is handed
down to us by logic alone.
Secondly, and relatedly, I do not wish to dispute what seems to be a robust consensus in
the historical scholarship, on why Russell himself took the premises of RM to be plausible.
He seems to have assumed that ‘identical propositions must have identical constituents.’31
By contemporary lights, this claim is controversial. So it is to assume that aboutness should
be understood mereologically, as constituency in a structured proposition.32 Goodman,
Uzquiano, and Dorr, take RM to rule out accounts of propositions such as those recently
defended by Nathan Salmon, Scott Soames, Peter Hanks, and others.33 If RM is valid,
it does put pressure on theories of structured propositions. However, that is not the
end of it. RM purports to rule out any account of propositions on which propositional
identity is sensitive to aboutness considerations. While the source of such considerations
may be related to sentential structure, the theory of aboutness may be separated from
the metaphysics of structured propositions, and it still provides enough motivation for the
premises.
For example, contemporary theories of aboutness such as those of Stephen Yablo or
Kit Fine take propositional identity to imply sameness of topic. So they validate versions
of Hyp. Should we be prepared to extend such theories, which are stated in first-order lan-
guages, to the higher-order domain (an extension against which I see no motivation), Yablo
and Fine’s theories would likewise be shown inconsistent by RM.34 Contrary to Goodman,
31Bernard Linsky, Russell’s Metaphysical Logic (Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 1999), at p. 155.
32Joshua Armstrong and Jason Stanley, “Singular Thoughts and Singular Propositions,” Philosophical
Studies, cliv, 2 (2011): 205–22.
33Nathan Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); Scott Soames, Rethinking Lan-
guage, Mind, and Meaning (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); Peter Hanks, Propositional
Content (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015).
34See Yablo, “Aboutness,” op. cit. and Fine, “Angellic Content,” op. cit. It suffices to show that
these theories satisfy Hyp, contradiction then follows from Comprehension and Existence1 or Existence2.
Suppose for reductio that a 6= b and let F be such that, at a world/state w, Fa and ¬Fb. Suppose
moreover that Fa expresses the same proposition as Fb. (i) The Yablovian ‘thick proposition’ expressed
by Fa is an ordered pair of the intension |Fa| and the subject matter of Fa, which is a set of verifiers
|Fa|+Y and falsifiers |Fb|
−








Y }〉. It follows
that |Fa| = |Fb|, contradicting the assumption. (ii) The Finean ‘angellic content’ of Fa is an ordered pair
of the set of verifiers |Fa|+F and falsifiers |Fb|
−
F . So if Fa and Fb express the same proposition, by the same
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Uzquiano, and Dorr, it is not just a possibly controversial metaphysics of structured propo-
sitions that rests on Hyp, but the logic of aboutness itself. Taking away Hyp puts severe
limits on our ability to study hyperintensionality in a formal language. The move against
Hyp comes at a very high cost.
5 Dynamic Abstraction
A different approach seems worth exploring. Seeing the striking parallel between RM and
Russell’s paradox from Basic Law V, a natural way to proceed is to drop the problematic
existence assumption, Existence1 or Existence2 depending on preference. Standard set
theory has that the problematic Russellian set of non-self-membered sets does not exist.
Not all predicates determine a set. Rejection of Existence1 or Existence2 amounts to deny-
ing the existence of the problematic Russellian proposition. In particular, the Russellian
sentence ‘fR’ does not determine a proposition available for reference and quantification.
There are various proposals for a “bottom up” conception of abstraction. One ad-
vantage is that grounded abstraction lets us formulate all kinds of intuitively plausible
abstractions, including the infamous Basic Law V, without contradiction. A second advan-
tage is that we avoid restricting the logic of aboutness for exogenous reasons. The proposal
outlined below is a version of the strategy defended by Øystein Linnebo.35
I proceed by officially dropping Existence1, and replace it with its free counterpart.
(Here and below, there are two versions of the revised theory, according to the choice
concerning propositional variables discussed above. For simplicity, official statements are
given only for the first-order version.)
F [ψ]→ (∃![ψ]→ ∃pFp/[ψ]) Free Existence:
As usual, ∃![ψ] abbreviates an existence statement such as ∃p(p = [ψ]). We can now allow
for failure of reference for terms such as [ψ], that purport to designate the sense of an
expression.
reasoning as above it follows that |Fa|+F = |Fb|
+
F . So the sets of verifying states are coextensive. Hence in
particular w ∈ |Fa|+F and w ∈ |Fb|
+
F , contradicting the assumption. So both for Fine and for Yablo, if Fa
expresses the same proposition as Fb, then a = b, so long as F discriminates between a and b at some w.
35Linnebo, “Thin Objects,” op. cit. For alternatives, see James Studd, “Abstraction Reconceived,”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, lxvii, 2 (2016): 579–615; Hannes Leitgeb, “Abstraction
Grounded: A Note on Abstraction and Truth,” in P. Ebert and M. Rossberg, eds., Abstractionism: Essays
in the Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 269–82.
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PropAbst must be weakened accordingly. PropAbst implicitly assumes that the gram-
maticality of a sentence suffices for reference to the proposition it expresses. For example,
‘fR’ is grammatical according to the type theory, but there is no proposition it expresses
that we can refer to or quantify over. This lesson may sound incongruous: we use ‘fR’ in
proof, so there must be something it says. On my view, it is best to think that the sen-
tence does express a proposition, but that such proposition lies outside the initial domain
of discourse. In other words, grammaticality suffices merely for the possible existence of
the proposition expressed by a sentence: existence that depends, in some sense, on the
objects the sentence is about.36 Two claims are important:
(i) Propositions are, in some sense, language-dependent: they are abstracts of sentences.
(ii) What is expressed by sentences may not be what is referred to by singular terms that
purport to designate propositions.
Suppose that whatever we can refer to is collected in a domain D. Given the objects in D,
we may express a proposition about them, though that proposition may fail to be in D,
lest we would be able to refer to it. This would blur the line between what can be referred
to and what can be expressed. We could, of course, consider an extended domain D′ which
includes the propositions expressed by sentences that are about elements of D. However,
sentences about the elements of D′ would express propositions that are not in D′. And so
on.37
These considerations suggest that PropAbst is better replaced by a modal principle,
which for clarity I state as the combination of two components, about the existence and
the identity of propositions respectively:
PAbst1: ♦∃p(p = [ψ])
PAbst2: ∀p∀q((p = [ψ] ∧ q = [ϕ])→ (p = q ↔ ψ ⇔ ϕ))
36The claim that grammaticality doesn’t suffice for actual existence doesn’t fit well with a Neo-Fregean
interpretation of abstraction principles, and appears to be in tension with the so-called Syntactic Priority
Thesis. This seems to imply that, more generally, the reading I am advocating for abstraction doesn’t fit
well with the Neo-Fregean program.
37There are various options concerning the notion of dependency in (i), one of which is contingentism. See
Robert Stalnaker, “Merely Possible Propositions,” in B. Hale and A. Hoffmann, eds., Modality (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 21–34; Peter Fritz, “Propositional Contingentism,” The Review of
Symbolic Logic, ix, 1 (2016): 123–42. A non-metaphysical interpretation of the modality is presented by
Kit Fine, “Relatively Unrestricted Quantification,” in A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano, eds., Absolute Generality
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 20–44; further discussion could benefit from Øystein
Linnebo and Stewart Shapiro, “Actual and Potential Infinity,” Noûs, liii, 1 (2019): 160–91. I remain open
to these various options.
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PAbst1 is a schema. Any of its instances states that it is possible that there is a
proposition expressed by ψ. Any instance of schema PAbst2 states that necessarily for any
p and q if p is the proposition expressed by ψ and q is the proposition expressed by ϕ, then
p is q just in case ψ and ϕ are synonymous. Following Linnebo, the modality is constrained
by the S4.2 axioms.38
The notion of hyperintensional equivalence is as above, and so is the unrestricted com-
prehension principle. Of course, comprehension remains non-modal. The logic is overall
predicative, since RM can be understood as a reductio of the modal impredicative compre-
hension statement ∃X∀p(Xp ↔ ψp). However, such statement is implausible: there is
no reason to think that there is a set of all propositions that could possibly be expressed,
and that satisfy φ. There is, of course, a set of all propositions that exist, and that satisfy
ψ, but collections of “all possible propositions” are blocked. The present work belongs to
a tradition of modal approaches to the set-theoretic and the semantic paradoxes, versions
of which are explored also by Geoffrey Hellman and Roy Cook, among others.39
We may think of the initial domain D as containing absolutely everything in the range
of the first-order individual variables (of type e), together with all sets of them. The
combination ♦∃ may then be understood as introducing more things to such domain: in
particular, the propositions expressed by sentences about objects in D. These extra things
are, of course, not individuals, nor sets of them, but abstracts of sentences. These can all
be collected into sets, together with the objects that were already there. By abstraction,
further propositions about this wider domain can be introduced. And so on.
6 Prior’s Troubles
The predicative conception of propositions I outlined relies on a distinction between propo-
sitions expressed by sentences and propositions that can be referred to by the use of a sin-
gular term, at any given stage in the abstraction process, and on the idea that propositions
about a given domain of objects depend on those objects. This conception provides an ac-
count of various puzzles about propositions. We might look at these further consequences
38Linnebo, “The Potential Hierarchy of Sets,” op. cit. Besides the rule of Necessitation, and the familiar
laws K, M, and 4, namely ` (ψ → φ) → (ψ → φ), ` ψ → ψ, and ` ψ → ψ respectively, the logic
includes axiom G: ` ♦ψ → ♦ψ. These conditions are intended to isolate a plausible notion of possibility
that is of service to modalized abstraction principles.
39Geoffrey Hellman, “On the Significance of the Burali-Forti Paradox,” Analysis, lxxi, 4 (2011): 631–37;
Roy Cook and Geoffrey Hellman, “Extendability and Paradox,” in R. Cook and G. Hellman, eds., Hilary
Putnam on Logic and Mathematics (Cham: Springer, 2018), pp. 51–75.
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to assess the fruitfulness of the predicative conception.
Consider, for example, the Prior-Kaplan paradox, also known as the Intensional Liar.40
The paradox is best formulated by means of second-order propositional variables,41 and
thus assuming Existence2. Consider the claim that any proposition materially equivalent
to the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 is itself necessary. This claim is of course not true, since
the proposition that grass is green is contingent and materially equivalent to 2 + 2 = 4.
But, perhaps, at some possible world a proposition is necessary if and only if it is materially
equivalent to 2 + 2 = 4. More generally, it seems intuitively possible that any proposition
materially equivalent to some proposition ψ has property Q. This is Kaplan’s principle.
David Kaplan defends its intuitive plausibility, and argues that if it is false, it should be
falsified by our metaphysical committments, not by logic itself.42
♦∀q(Qq ↔ (ψ ↔ q)) KP:
KP is schematic in ψ and Q. Consider the proposition that nothing that is believed by
Epimenides is the case: ∀p(Qp→ ¬p), where Q now stands for ‘is believed by Epimenides.’
For brevity, let us shorten it ‘γ.’ Suppose that γ is true for reductio. An instance of KP
is that ♦∀q(Qq ↔ (γ ↔ q)). So, at some world, ∀q(Qq ↔ (γ ↔ q)). By Existence2,
Qγ ↔ (γ ↔ γ), hence Qγ. Moreover from the reductio assumption and Existence2, it
follows that Qγ → ¬γ. Hence ¬γ and we conclude the reductio. By DeMorgan, ∃p(Qp∧p),
that is, something believed by Epimenides is the case. Let p′ be such proposition. Then
Qp′ ↔ (γ ↔ p′), and so γ is the case. Contradiction.43
The proof of the Prior-Kaplan paradox doesn’t go through if we are required to be care-
ful about which propositions are quantified over, at any given world, for the simple reason
that the world at which the proposition expressed by ∀p(Qp→ ¬p) exists, by PAbst1, may
not be the world at which, by KP, everything materially equivalent to that proposition is
believed by Epimenides. Intuitively, the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Nothing
believed by Epimenides is the case’ possibly exists. It is also possible that anything be-
40Prior, “Objects of Thought,” op. cit.; Kaplan, “A Problem in Possible World Semantics,” op. cit.;
Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne, and Gabriel Uzquiano, “Higher-Order Free Logic and the Prior-Kaplan
Paradox,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, xlvi, 2 (2016): 493–541.
41This allows us to avoid the use of a truth predicate. Since so much has been written on the truth
predicate in connection with the paradoxes, its use would be a distraction. However, the truth predicate is
irrelevant for RM.
42Kaplan, “A Problem in Possible World Semantics,” op. cit.
43The proof is strictly classical, following Prior’s original. Kaplan’s version requires stronger principles
and is formulated in possible world semantics. There is also an intuitionistic version.
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lieved by Epimenides is materially equivalent to the proposition that nothing believed by
Epimenides is the case. But these two possibilities are distinct, and it is a simple modal
fallacy to conflate them. Of course, should KP be strengthened to ∀q(Qq ↔ (γ ↔ q))
to avoid the impasse, we would then recognize it as a necessitated instance of comprehen-
sion. The Prior-Kaplan paradox would then provide additional evidence, besides RM, that
necessitated comprehension is false.
Prior discusses another argument, and the last I will consider in this paper. Consider
again the proposition γ, that nothing believed by Epimenides is the case. Suppose that
Epimenides believes γ, that is, believes that Q∀p(Qp → ¬p), and that γ is the case, for
reductio. Then by Existence2, Qγ → ¬γ. By modus ponens and reductio, ¬γ. Therefore
Qγ ∧ ¬γ, hence ∃p(Qp ∧ ¬p) by Existence2. On the other hand, since ¬γ, by DeMorgan
∃p(Qp ∧ p). Prior thus concludes what is known as Prior’s Theorem:
Q∀p(Qp→ ¬p)→ ∃p(Qp ∧ ¬p) ∧ ∃p(Qp ∧ p) PT:
If Epimenides believes that nothing he believes is the case, then he believes something false,
and something true as well. As Williamson remarks, this just looks to be straightforwardly
false.44 Notice that, in the reasoning, we do conclude that ¬γ. Indeed, that’s a false
proposition that Epimenides believes. We are left puzzling about what might be the true
proposition he believes. On an impredicative conception of propositions, the universe of
propositions is, as it were, oddly plenitudinous.
Prior himself had little to comment about PT but to quip that ‘there are surprises
in logic.’45 Thus there might be comfort in the observation the derivation doesn’t go
through on a predicative conception of propositions. In particular, even if we assume that
nothing believed by Epimenides is the case, ∀p(Qp → ¬p), the proposition expressed by
such sentence is not in its own domain of quantification. Even if Epimenides believes that
nothing he believes is the case, and it is true that nothing he believes is the case, it doesn’t
follow that there is something true that he believes.
44Timothy Williamson, “Reply to Bacon, Hawthorne, and Uzquiano,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
xlvi, 4/5 (2016): 542–47, at p. 542.
45Prior, “Objects of Thought,” op. cit., at p. 80.
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There is, however, a modally strengthened version of PT that does follow:46
Q∀p(Qp→ ¬p)→ ♦∃p(Qp ∧ ¬p) ∧ ♦∃p(Qp ∧ p) PT:
Yet this formula hardly deserves the honorific title of theorem. It says that if Epimenides
believes, of necessity, that nothing he believes is the case, then he could believe a truth
and he could believe a falsehood. Since there is no plausible sense of necessity on which
someone, including Epimenides, necessarily believes that nothing he believes is the case,
PT is true simply because it is a material conditionals with a false antecedent.
I do not expect that these results should strike anyone as the obvious ones to get
concerning these puzzles. At this point, however, it is interesting to compare the two
conceptions of the metaphysics of propositions I have contrasted. In the Prior-Kaplan
paradox, someone who wishes to maintain Existence1 or Existence2 would have to deny
KP. A fortiori, it is impossible that only one proposition be the unique bearer of a property.
Indeed, PT comes out a logical truth.47 However, even a plenitudinous universe is no
relief with the Russell-Myhill paradox. There, as we discussed, one has to be denied that
propositions are hyperintensional. The impredicative universe of proposition is therefore
rich, perhaps oddly so, but also coarse-grained. In contrast, from a predicative perspective,
a general approach yields a unified pattern of response that is shown to be robust across a
range of puzzles. The universe is not as plenitudinous, but distinctions in reality may be
sharply reflected in thought.
7 Conclusion
The main topic of discussion has been the Russell-Myhill paradox, which I presented as
a paradox of aboutness. I then considered a recent interpretive line, according to which
the paradox shows that propositions are not structured objects. I have argued that this
reply goes too far: it must deny that propositions about distinct objects are distinct. This
position is incompatible with a substantial notion of aboutness, on which the identity of
46Let γ be ∀p(Qp → ¬p). Suppose Qγ. By PAbst1, ♦∃p([p] = γ). Consider a world w in which
the proposition expressed by γ exists. Suppose that γ is the case at w for reductio. By Free Existence,
Qγ → ¬γ. By Qγ, we have Qγ at w. Hence ¬γ, and we conclude the reductio. Therefore, at w, both Qγ
and ¬γ. Thus ∃p(Qp ∧ ¬p) at w. Moreover by ¬γ, from DeMorgan, ∃p(Qp ∧ p) at w. Closing the modal
and conditional reasoning yields PT.
47Andrew Bacon and Gabriel Uzquiano, “Some Results on the Limits of Thought,” Journal of Philosoph-
ical Logic, xlvii, 6 (2018): 991–99.
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propositions is sensitive to aboutness distinctions.
I have then reconstructed the Russell-Myhill paradox as one engendered by abstraction,
and argued that it is not the result of a confusion between use and mention. Once a choice
about propositional variables is made, the paradox follows – unless, that is, one maintains a
conceptual distinction between propositions that can be referred to and quantified over and
propositions that can be expressed by doing so. This distinction offers a good motivation to
apply a version of the general strategy to deal with impredicativity outlined, for example,
in the work of Linnebo.
In a way, Frege was right in thinking that his distinction between sense and reference
undermines the Russell-Myhill paradox. Something like Frege’s distinction can be enforced
in a modal setting, if we allow that anything expressed at a stage can be referred to at
the next. Further puzzles about propositions are explained away by the same proposal,
yielding a unified and well-motivated picture of semantic reality.
Appendix: Semantics
The framework described here can be interpreted in a positive free logic with dual domain
semantics within a Kripke frame. The semantics I shall describe is intended for illustrative
purposes, and to show consistency. There are two versions of the framework discussed
above.
Version 1: First-order propositional variables
Let E 6= ∅, the sort of individuals, and Pn, the sort of propositions, be disjoint sets. A
model Mn is a structure 〈E,Pn, aσn〉, with a an interpretation function relative to a variable
assignment σ. For brevity, for every linguistic expression f , I write ‘fa’ for aσn(f). E is the
(fixed) domain of type e, Pn is the domain of type () in Mn.
A frame M is a list of models 〈M0,M1, ...〉 ordered by the relation ≤, with the following
properties:
Reflexivity: n ≤ n
Antisymmetry: if n ≤ m and m ≤ n then n = m
Transitivity: if n ≤ m and m ≤ n′ then n ≤ n′
Convergence: if n ≤ m and n ≤ m′ then there is a n′, m ≤ n′ and m′ ≤ n′
Monotonicity: if n ≤ m then Pn ⊆ Pm
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The first four properties interpret the S4.2 axioms. Each model Mn ∈ M has a domain
Dn := E ∪Pn. Note that if n ≤ m then Dn ⊆ Dm. Let D :=
⋃
nDn be the so-called ‘outer




The set of terms t includes first-order individual variables, propositional variables, second-
order variables, and singular terms designating propositions. Terms are interpreted as
usual, and in addition, ([ψ])a ∈ (D− E). Let {0, 1} ⊆ E be two special objects of type e.
Formulas are interpreted on {0, 1}:
(Xt1, ..., tn)
a = 1 iff 〈(t1)a, .., (tn)a〉 ∈ Xa
(¬ψ)a = 1 iff ψa = 0
(ψ → ϕ)a = 1 iff ψa = 0 or ϕa = 1
(x = y)a = 1 iff xa = ya
(ψ ⇔ ϕ)a = 1 iff ([ψ])a = ([ϕ])a
(∃xψ)a = 1 iff there is a d ∈ E,ψa[x/d] = 1
(∃pψ)a = 1 iff there is a d ∈ Pn, ψa[x/d] = 1
(∃Xψ)a = 1 iff there is a d ∈ Pow(D), ψa[x/d] = 1
aσn(♦ψ) = 1 iff there is a Mm ∈ M, n ≤ m and aσm(ψ) = 1
Note that (i) since ψa ∈ {0, 1} for all formulas ψ, the relation [·] takes an object in {0, 1}
and assigns it to an element of D−E. (ii) It would be straightforward, however, to interpret
formulas relative to a set W of possible worlds. Of course ♦, defined as above, wouldn’t
thereby range over elements of W . (iii) There are no propositional variables defined over
D, and a fortiori no unrestricted propositional quantifiers.
Hence, the metalanguage is strictly stronger than the object language. This is perhaps
philosophically disturbing.48 A proper discussion of this topic is both beyond the aims of
this paper and too complex to be settled here.
48G. Aldo Antonelli, “Proto-Semantics for Positive Free Logic,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, xxix, 3
(2000): 277–94.
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Version 2: Second-order propositional variables
We define Pn := Tn ∪ Fn, with Tn ∩ Fn = ∅. Intuitively, Tn and Fn are the set of
true and false propositions respectively. The notions of model, frame, domain, and outer
domain remain the same, with the additional requirement that if n ≤ m then Tn ⊆ Tm
and Fn ⊆ Fm. Let the set of n-ary propositional functions be S := {s : Dn 7→ (D − E)},
with Dn the n-fold Cartesian product of D. The interpretation function may now send




The denotation of terms is defined as above. Formulas, which now designate propositions,
are interpreted by allocating the propositions expressed into Tn or Fn, for each model.
ψa ∈ Tn iff it is not the case that ψa ∈ Fn
(Xt1, ..., tn)
a ∈ Tn iff Xa〈(t1)a, .., (tn)a〉 ∈ Tn
(¬ψ)a ∈ Tn iff ψa ∈ Fn
(ψ → ϕ)a ∈ Tn iff ψa ∈ Fn or ϕa ∈ Tn
(x = y)a ∈ Tn iff xa = ya
(ψ ⇔ ϕ)a ∈ Tn iff ([ψ])a = ([ϕ])a
(∃xψ)a ∈ Tn iff there is a d ∈ E,ψa[x/d] ∈ Tn
(∃pψ)a ∈ Tn iff there is a d ∈ Pn, ψa[x/d] ∈ Tn
(∃Xψ)a ∈ Tn iff there is a d ∈ S, ψa[x/d] ∈ Tn
aσn(♦ψ) ∈ Tn iff there is a Mm ∈ M, n ≤ m and aσm(ψ) ∈ Tm
Note that in this case the relation [·] is the identity function on D − E. A valuation
vn : Form 7→ {0, 1} can be defined, with Form the set of formulas, and 0, 1 two designated
individuals in E. It is enough to stipulate that vn(Xt1, ..., tn) = 1 iff (Xt1, ..., tn)
a ∈ Tn.
Then vn can be extended to all formulas in accordance with the clauses above.
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